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The Santa Cruz massacre, in which 
Indonesian troops killed up to 200 pro-
independence demonstrators in East Timor 
last November, received worldwide 
publicity, forcing governments to make 
representations to Indonesia (see Timor 
Link, No 22, February 1992). Indonesia, 
stung by the criticism, responded unusually 
quickly, and set up a commission of inquiry 
into the events. 
This issue looks at the commissiem's 
findings and describes reactions in the 
United States and Britain to a five-week 
'damage limitation tour' by the Indonesian 
foreign minister, Ali Alatas. During his visit 
to the United States, Britain, France, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Canada, Brussels and 
Geneva, he assured Western governments 
that action would be taken against those 
responsible for the killings. 
Two generals, Brigadier-General Rudolf 
Warouw, the military commander of East 
Timor, and Udayana Regional Commander 
Sintong Panjaitan have been relieved of their 
duties. But at the same time subversion 
charges are being brought against several 
East Timorese arrested as a result of the 
Santa Cruz massacre. 
Timor Link also analyses the longer-term 
international implications of the Santa Cruz 
massacre and looks at the current efforts of 
some Western governments to pressure 
Portugal, the former colonial ruler and 
current president of the European 
Community, to temper its demands for East 
Timor's self-determination. At the recent 
session of the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights, an EC-backed resolution 
was blocked. 
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What future for East Timar? 
Opportunities 
for pressure 
JOHN TAYLOR, author of Indonesia's 
Forgotten War, analyses the prospects 
for East Timor's self-determination in 
the wake of the Santa Cruz massacre, 
highlighting the changes that have 
taken place in the international context 
since Indonesia's invasion in 1975. 
The Santa Cruz massacre is the latest in a 
series of human rights atrocities committed 
by Indonesia in East Timor. In July 1981 
approximately 1,000 people were killed in 
an Indonesian 'fence of legs' (pagar betis) 
operation in Aitana. In September 1981 
some 400 people were murdered by soldiers 
in Lacluta. And since 1975 at least 150,000 
people have died as a result of military 
campaigns and starvation induced by forced 
resettlement. There has been extensive 
imprisonment without trial, extra-judicial 
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killings, disappearances and widespread 
torture. 
Despite this level of repression, however, 
the occupation has on the whole been 
unsuccessful from Indonesia's point of view. 
Resistance has continued unabated. Most 
of those taking part in the demonstration 
preceding the Santa Cruz massacre were 
from the 'second generation ', the children 
of the 1970s whom the Indonesian military 
had hoped to socialise as an indigenous 
support base for East Timor's incorporation 
into Indonesia. 
The economic development that has 
taken place since 1975 has not benefitted 
East Timer's population, but rather migrants 
from eastern Indonesia and a small group 
of military leaders who have accumulated 
substantial sums through control of the 
import-export trade. 
Dipomatically, the occupation has proved 
to be something of an embarrassment for 
Indonesia, with the issue of East Timor 
raised critically ~nd repeatedly in 
international fora . 
New context 
To predict trends for the coming period in 
. East Timor, one has to recall the context in 
which the invasion occurred. This was 
characterised by an international situation 
in which many of the leading industrial 
powers were prepared to condone 
Indonesian actions. 
Following the Vietnam debacle, the 
United States was consolidating its relations 
with friendly powers in the region. 
Indonesia, as a staunchly anti-communist, 
strategically located state, was given 
priority. Portugal, following its 1974 
'Carnation Revolution', was trying to divest 
itself of its colonial territories as quickly as 
possible and was prepared to concede 
control of East Timor to Indonesia if 
necessary. Australia was moving closer 
economically to South-East Asia and, like 
Japan, saw Indonesia as a crucial partner, 
particularly over oil in the post-197 4 Opec 
era. 
This international context has changed 
dramatically. The Cold War has ended and 
Indonesia is now of lower strategic 
importance to the United States. Other 
South-East Asian economies like Malaysia 
and Thailand have developed rapidly, 
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providing other counterbalances to Japan's 
economic presence in the region. And 
Portugal, rather than acquiescing in 
Indonesia's actions, is now a leading critic 
of the occupation and is calling for a military 
withdrawal and a referendum in the 
territory. 
The only government remammg 
supportive of Indonesia is Australia, whose 
determination to exploit oil deposits in the 
seas between East Timor and Australia has 
overridden all other considerations. 
Internationally, there is also a resurgence 
of nationalism, an increasing importance 
accorded to regional movements, and an 
emphasis on aid and loans being conditional 
on 'good governance'. In this changed 
situation, governments such as those of the 
United States, Japan and the European 
Community have no need to remain so 
supportive of the Indonesian project in East 
Tim or. 
This does not mean to say that they will 
not support it, of course. But the 
international climate is such that these 
governments are more likely to be more 
responsive to pressure than in the 1970s. 
Changes in Indonesia 
Similarly - although this should not be 
overstressed - conditions in Indonesia 
have changed a little. Diplomatically, it is 
conceded in private that the invasion was a 
mistake. Politically, some non-govern-
mental organisations, and even some 
individuals within the army, are questioning 
the benefits of a continued military 
presence. For some, the occupation is 
identified with a political regime whose 
culture and organisation require major 
changes if Indonesia is to industrialise with 
the same speed and success as other 
South-East Asian regimes. 
Against this , of course, are the obvious 
points that many of today's prominent 
generals earned their stripes in campaigns 
in East Timor: that leading generals continue 
to gain substantial wealth from companies 
in East Timor; that withdrawal would 
involve such a loss of face that it is 
unthinkable. Such views are deeply 
entrenched; but, unlike 1975, there are 
differences over the need to continue the 
military presence at its present level. 
This limited questioning of the military 
role, together with the reduced need for the 
governments of the industrialised states to 
support the Indonesian regime, have 
created opportu111t1es for international 
pressure on Indonesia which were never 
possible in earlier periods of the occupation. 
This may explain why the criticisms of the 
Indonesian military from within the 
Indonesian government have been voiced 
more openly in recent years. 
Prospects 
It should also give added impetus to groups 
and organisations working on East Timar 
internationally that their rigorous presen-
tations of human rights abuses will not fall 
on such deaf ears as in the past. The 
conditions for a resolution of the conflict in 
East Timar no"· seem to be more favourable 
than ever before. 
Having said this, however, it should also 
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be remembered that these conclusions have 
also been reached by Indonesia's military 
leaders who will try to repress the problem 
before it develops into a more open issue. 
So while, on the one hand, Indonesia's 
foreign minister travels the world claiming 
that those who shot unarmed demonstrators 
in the Santa Cruz cemetery on 12 November 
1991 are to be punished, on the other hand, 
a new commander is appointed with the aim 
of introducing a more rigorous system of 
control and eliminating the opposition as 
quickly as possible. 
In the short term it is likely that the 
apparatus of internal repression will be 
strengthened following the Santa Cruz 
massacre. As with previous attempts, 
however, this is unlikely to succeed and the 
need for a resolution of the problem through 
negotiation will re-emerge. 
International pressure on the Indonesian 
government must therefore maintain the 
impressive momentum it has developed 
since the Santa Cruz massacre, both to 
publicise the undoubted increase in human 
rights abuses in the coming months, and to 
continue to press for a solution based on 
military withdrawal and a referendum on 
self-determination. 
A so to the world 
KIRS1Y SWORD criticises the advance 
report of the Indonesian National 
Com.mission of Inquiry (KPN), set up 
by the Indonesian government to 
provide an acceptable explanation to 
Western governments of the Santa Cruz 
massacre. 
One of the most controversial findings of the 
KPN's nine-page preliminary report was that 
'about fifty' civilians had been killed as a 
result of a 'spontaneous reaction by 
soldiers ... to protect themselves'. 
The fact that the KPN found the official 
military figure of 'only 19' to be inaccurate 
was seen by several commentators, 
including Amnesty International, as 
evidence of the pressure exerted on 
members of the Commission to produce a 
report which would satisfy foreign aid 
donors critical of the Indonesian military's 
version of events. There was no explanation 
of how the figure of 50 had been arrived at: 
eyewitnesses and other sources had put the 
death toll closer to 200. 
Another important discrepancy between 
the report and eyewitness accounts related 
to the conduct of the demonstrators and the 
response of the security forces to them. The 
report described the demonstrators and 
mourners as 'savage and quite out ·of 
control'. This negative picture clashed with 
both the testimonies of foreign eyewitnesses 
and evidence recorded on video by a British 
cameraman which clearly showed the 
enthusiasm and emotion of the crowd being 
kept in check by a number of young 
organisers of the demonstration. 
The report however, devoted consider-
able space to what it described as the 
demonstrators' 'premeditated provocation' 
of the security forces. It repeatedly 
described their use of 'anti-integrationist' 
flags and slogans, as if to prove that the 
demonstrators were themselves to blame for 
the slaughter and that, by extension, the 
security forces were justified in their use of 
lethal force . 
Although the report acknowledged that, 
in addition to the shootings, demonstrators 
were subjected to stabbings and beatings 
by the security forces, it ignored substantive 
evidence showing that the military's 
violence was perpetrated in a systematic and 
premeditated fashion. Instead, a group of 
'irregular members of the security forces 
acting outside the command structure' were 
blamed for the worst of the security forces' 
excesses. 
As the International Commission of Jurists 
noted in 'Blaming the Victims', which it 
presented to the UN Commission on Human 
Rights in 21 February, the reports of 
eyewitnesses contradicted the KPN report 
on every major point. The ICJ's evidence 
showed that the killings were not the result 
of provocation but a premeditated use of 
force against peaceful demonstrators. 
The IC) report found that the Indonesian 
report failed to meet internationally 
recognised standards of impartiality, 
credibility and technical competence, noting 
that the KPN made no attempt to interview 
non-Timorese eyewitnesses 'who could 
testify without fear and whose accounts 
contradict the findings of the advance report 
on every key issue'. 
Military discomfort 
Furthermore, it is clear from the tightly 
controlled visit of Amos Waka, the special 
envoy of the UN secretary-general, to East 
Timar in early February 1992, that the 
Indonesian military was unhappy with the 
continued on page 3 
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EAST TIMOR: 
A forgotten issue 
Timor, area 7,400 square miles, is one of the 
easternmost islands of the Indonesian 
archipelago and lies 300 miles north of 
Australia, its nearest neighbour. The western 
part of the island, formerly a Dutch colony, 
belongs to Indonesia, whereas East Timor 
was for more than 400 years a Portuguese 
colony. 
In 1974 Portugal decolonised East Timor 
and the territory's newly formed political 
parties began discussing options for the 
future federation with Portugal, 
independence, or integration with 
Indonesia. 
The Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) 
initially favoured the first option but then 
joined a coalition with the nationalist 
liberation movement, Fretilin to demand 
independence and call for a rejection of 
colonialism and racial discrimination. A third 
party, Apodeti, with a small political base 
in the country, was used as a vehicle for 
Indonesian propaganda and pressure in 
favour of integration. 
On 11 August 1975 the UDT staged a 
coup to pre-empt Indonesian threats to 
intervene if Fretilin came to power. In the 
ensuing civil war, 1,500 people lost their 
lives. By September 1975, however, Fretilin 
was in control of virtually all of Portuguese 
Timor, following defection of Timorese 
colonial troops to the liberation movement's 
side. 
Indonesia, like the United States, was 
worried by the proximity of an independent 
state with radical policies and continued to 
threaten East Timor, despite previous 
assurances that Jakarta would respect the 
right of the East Timorese to independence. 
In September 1975 Indonesia dosed West 
Timor to journalists and on 7 December it 
launched a full-scale invasion of East Timor 
with the knowledge of the United States and 
the encouragement of Australia. East Timor 
was proclaimed the '27th province' of 
Indonesia. 
The invasion and annexation of East 
Timor has been brutal: up to 200,000 
people, a third of the population, have died 
as a result of Indonesian rule. But the 
majority of Timorese have not accepted 
subjugation; Indonesia has been unable to 
eliminate the desire of the East Timorese for 
self-determination and an armed resistance 
movement still remains in the hills, albeit 
in dwindling numbers. 
Although the invasion has been 
condemned by successive United Nations 
resolutions, the international community has 
done little or nothing to implement them, 
given the major economic and geopolitical 
interests of the United States, Japan and 
particularly Australia in the region. 
Indonesia's crucial strategic location and 
regional status ..:__ it has the world's fifth 
largest population, and large reserves of oil 
and other natural resources - have all 
encouraged the world to downplay East 
Timor's agony. 
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changes made by the KPN to their original 
version of the events. 
The Indonesian armed forces (ABRI) are 
rarely criticised in Indonesia and are not 
used to being dictated to. It is said that 
ABRI's chiefs are particularly d isgruntled 
with the blame laid at the feet of General 
Warouw, the sacked East Timar military 
commander. General Theo Syafei, 
Warouw's replacement, is known to have a 
more confrontational approach, and it is 
understood that the military presence in Dili 
has been increased in recent months. 
Wako's visit was heavily supervised by 
the military, which surrounded the airport 
in wait of his plane. Several days before his 
arrival, security forces blanketed the entire 
city, according to a Dili policeman, and 
arrests were made to pre-empt 
demonstrations. 
Visit of UN envoy 
In the wake of the KPN's report, a special 
envoy of UN secretary-general, Kenyan 
attorney-general Amos Wako, visited 
Indonesia and East Timor for six days in 
early February 1992. He was granted entry 
by the Indonesian government on the 
understanding that his visit would be 
clarificatory rather than investigative in 
nature. 
Although his plane landed safely in Dili, 
a plane carrying scores of journalists to Dili 
was unable to land 'because of bad 
weather'. 
Prior to his visit to East Timor on 12 
February, Wako met Indonesian Foreign 
Minister Ali Alatas , Indonesian Attorney-
General Singgih and State Secretary 
Murdiono, having examined the contents 
of the advance report on the Santa Cruz 
massacre. He also met members of the KPN. 
On arrival in East Timar, Wako held a 
meeting with East Timor's governor, Mario 
Carrascalao, accompanied by UN officials, 
the military commander of Udayana Region, 
Major-General HBL Mantiri, and Hadi 
Wayarabi, a member of the KPN. They 
discussed what measures the Indonesian 
government had taken over the Santa Cruz 
killings. 
Wako also had a private meeting with 
Bishop Carlos Belo, the Apostolic 
Administrator of Dili, and Dili Diocese Vicar 
General Father Alberto Ricardo. 
Wako followed the route of the fateful 
funeral procession which led to massacre 
in the Santa Cruz cemetery (held for a youth 
shot dead earlier by Indonesian troops). He 
was accompanied by Major-General Mantiri, 
but did not leave his vehicle. 
Questioned by journalists at the end of 
his trip, Waka said that he had been assured 
by President Suharto that the troops found 
to have been involved in the killings will 
be prosecuted. 
Among the issues raised by Waka were 
the prosecution of military personnel, 
identification of the dead and missing, the 
establishment of the number, location and 
identity of bodies, and general questions 
about East Timor's development. Further 
conclusions and recommendations would, 
he said, be included in his report to UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali. 
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UN role 
Between l tr5 and 1982 the United 
''ations adopted ten resolutions on East 
Timor. Security Council resolutions in 
19""'"i and 1976 called for immediate 
'' ithdrawal of Indonesian troops and for 
the people of East Timor to exercise their 
self-detem1ination. Similar resolutions 
were adopted annually until 1982. Since 
then the 'Question of East Timor' has 
been entrusted to the UN Secretary 
General. The UN still refuses to recognise 
Indonesia's illegal occupation, and 
regards Portugal, the former colonial 
ruler, as the Administering Power. 
Blaming the 
victims 
While the Indonesian government has 
promised court-martials for eight 
senior officers found reponsible for 
their role in the Santa Cruz killings, it 
is unclear whether any punitive action 
will be taken. At the same tilne, several 
East Tilnorese arrested in Dill and 
Jakarta for peaceful protests against the 
Santa Cruz massacre face serious 
charges, including subversion, which 
carries the death penalty. 
In Dili , the capital of East Timor, those 
arrested are charged with organising or 
participating in the memoria l procession 
which preceded the Santa Cruz massacre 
(held for a youth shot dead by Indonesian 
troops in October 1991). Two, Gregorio da 
Cunha Saldanha and Francisco Miranda 
Branco, are charged with subversion and 
masterminding the demonstration. The 
other six are charged with 'expressing 
hostility '. Their trials have not yet begun. 
Some 24 other East Timorese arrested in 
connection with the Santa Cruz massacre 
were reportedly released early in March 
1992. But Indonesian press reports quoted 
by Amnesty International in their ·u rgent 
Action' request issued on 26 March 1992 
indicate that they may actually be held 
outside Dili where they are undergoing 
'mental guidance' to 'become sound 
Indonesians capable of taking part in 
development' in the custody of Brigadier-
General Theo Syafei, the military 
commander of East Timor. 
In Jakarta, the Indonesian capital, 
Fernando Araujo and Joao Freitas Camara 
are charged with subversion, while Agapito 
Cardoso, Domingos Barreto and Virgilio da 
Silva Guterres face the charge of 'spreading 
hatred'. As in East Timor, a group of 17 
students have reportedly been released but 
are now in detention in East Jakarta, 
pending the emergence of new evidence 
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with which they could be prosecuted. They 
are also likely to be called back to the trials 
as witnesses. 
Observers 
Whereas the detainees in Dili were allowed 
a lawyer (though not of their choice) during 
interrogation, the Jakarta detainees, many 
of whom were held in incommunicado 
detention, were initially denied access to 
relatives and lawyers in all but a few cases, 
in contravention of the Indonesian Code of 
Criminal Procedure (KUHAP) and 
international law. They are now, with the 
exception of Fernando de Araujo, who has 
been denied legal council, being defended 
by the Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal 
Aid Institute, LBH) which was at first refused 
access to them. 
Four students detained in Denpasar, 
Indonesia, were also badly beaten and 
tortured. 
The Jakana trials began in the second 
week of March . This is the first time that the 
trial of East Timorese prisoners will take 
place in Jakarta and they are being watched 
with interest by many organisations, 
including the International Commission of 
Jurists. They will be watching to see if the 
proceedings comply with Indonesian law 
- criticised as fa iling to protect human 
rights (see box) - and international legal 
standards, as set out in UN covenants. 
Repressive 
system 
In a report submitted at the 48th session 
of the UN Commission of Human Rights 
Commission in Geneva in February, the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, 
Professor PH Kooijmans has 
recommended that Indonesia should set 
up a comm1Ss1on to deal with 
widespread human rights abuses. 
Although he did not witness the Santa 
Cruz massacre, Kooijmans was in Di.Ii at 
the time to investigate torture in 
Indonesia at the request of the UN 
secretary-general, and his recommen-
dations will add to the pressure on 
Indonesia over East Timor. 
His 22-page report, which makes 
special mention of the events of 12 
November in East Timar, gives a detailed 
description of the complexity of the 
Indonesian legal system and its 
shortcomings in the area of human rights. 
It alleges that torture is routinely 
practised, particularly in unstable regions 
under Indonesian control like East Timor 
and Irian Jaya or where state security is 
perceived to be threatened. Abuses often 
occur during incommunicado detention. 
He blames these human rights 
violations on the 'virtually unbridled 
power of the police', who have 
unrestricted control over detalaees 
during the first 20 days of detention, and 
Indonesian criticism repressed 
One of the East Timorese on trial in Jakarta, 
Joao Freitas da Camara, is also charged with 
rece1vmg donations from foreign 
organisations, quoted in the indictment to 
include the Australian Council for Overseas 
Aid, Amnesty International and CIIR. 
The repressive measures used by the 
Indonesian authorities against the East 
Timorese have also been used to quell 
criticism by Indonesian human rights 
activists and journalists. 
On 20 November three Jakarta human 
rights activists, Indra Tjahyono, HJC Princen 
and Yopi Lasut, were called by the 
authorities to answer questions on their 
sources of information on the Dili massacre. 
They were subjected to daily interrogations 
until 7 December. 
Three journalists with the weekly 
magazine Jakarta, Jakarta lost their jobs in 
January 1992 after they published 
testimonies of eyewitnesses of massacre 
which contradicted the findings of 
Indonesia's Official Commission of Inquiry. 
At the end of February, the Indonesian 
government stopped allowing journalists to 
enter East Timor, as tension mounted over 
the expected arrival of a Portuguese peace 
ship (see p.5). A number of foreign visitors 
have also been expelled from the territory, 
including a Japanese activist, Wada Tetsuro, 
w ho was interrogated for seven hours, made 
to sign blank forms and had films and videos 
confiscated. 
highlights the fact that 'judges do not 
oblige the police and the armed forces 
to respect the law by vigorously rejecting 
all forms of illegal arrest and all evidence 
obtained during irregular detention'. Nor 
is there any independent authority to 
which complaints about torture or 
maltreatment can be addressed. 
He concludes that discontent in East 
Timar 'can only be removed by a policy 
of strict respect for basic human rights, 
even if those basic rights are not 
respected in the same way by the other 
side'. 
Among Kooijmans' proposals for 
improving Indonesia's human rights 
record are ratification of the 1984 UN 
Convention against Torture, creating an 
awareness of human rights in an 
independent judiciary, the extension of 
criminal investigating procedures, 
respect of the detainee's right of access 
to a lawyer, the dismissal in court of 
evidence illegally acquired, the repeal of 
Indonesia's notorious Anti-Subversion 
Law, and the creation of a national 
conunission on human rights. 
He also recommends the establish-
ment of an authority to deal with 
complaints of human rights violations, 
endowed with investigative powers. 
Places of detention should be visited 
regularly by an independent authority, 
and officials found guilty of commltt1ng 
or condoning~ 'severeftpunfshect'. 
Jurisdiction over~ committed t;y 
~ c:I forces and the 
police shoUld to the cMlim 
courts. 
Portugal faces 
pressure to 
• compromise 
Portugal's decision last October to 
cancel a parliamentary delegation to 
East Tim.or - seen as crncial to 
breaking the deadlock in UN-sponsored 
negotiations between Lisbon and 
Jakarta over the annexed territory's 
future - caused massive disappoint-
ment among Timorese (see Timor Link 
February 1992). 
Since the Santa Cruz massacre, 
Portugal has been seeking support for 
an international settlement of the 
dispute. But as this report on discussion 
of East Tim.or by the UN Commission 
on Human Rights shows, Lisbon faces 
considerable pressure from its Western 
allies to compromise with Jakarta. 
Portugal, recognised by the UN as the 
'administering power' of East Timor, 
assumed the presidency of the European 
Community for six months in January 92, 
anxious to use its position to obtain progress 
for a settlement in its former colony. 
On 4 February Portugal obtained EC 
backing for UN-sponsored talks between 
Lisbon and Jakarta on the territory's future , 
with 'political debate without conditions' to 
be held under the auspices of the UN 
secretary-general. The talks would be aimed 
at finding a 'just, global and internationally 
acceptable solution for East Timor' in the 
words of Portuguese Foreign Minster Joao 
de Deus Pinheiro. 
Within weeks, however, Portugal, under 
pressure from fellow EC member states, 
found itself forced to weaken its position at 
48th session of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights (UNCHR) in Geneva where 
East Timor was back on the agenda for the 
first time in seven years. 
Disappointment 
To the deep disappointment of the Timorese 
and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), including the International 
Commission of Jurists, Pax Christi and 
Amnesty International, which had been 
lobbying for over three weeks, Portugal and 
Indonesia agreed a 'Consensus Declaration' 
with the support of Dutch and British 
delegations. Declarations carry less weight 
than resolutions, and an earlier resolution, 
drafted by the EC, had been withdrawn. 
The text of this draft resolution was 
relatively strong. While not calling for a UN 
investigation of the Santa Cruz massacre, it 
recalled past UN resolutions, appealed for 
a comprehensive and internationally 
acceptable settlement, called for access to 
East Timor by human rights organisations, 
and included an clause which would make 
sure that East Timor would be discussed at 
the UNCHR's next session the following 
year. Portugal was pushing the resolution, 
both as chair of the EC and as the 
UN-recognised administering power of the 
territory. 
Background manoeuvres 
The resolution was co-sponsored by a wide 
variety of countries - 6 Latin American, 2 
African and 20 European. Other countries 
joined later bringing the total to 32. 
However only 14 of these were members 
of the Commission and had voting power, 
the others held only observer status. The 
Portuguese-favoured resolution was quickly 
opposed by several countries, including 
Japan, the United States and Australia. The 
latter, which recognises Indonesia's 
occupation of East Timor, was particularly 
determined to block the resolution's 
presentation and sought to confuse other 
delegates by accusing the Portuguese 
delegation of procedural irregularities. 
These manoeuvres were seen as an effort 
to persuade Portugal to reach an agreement 
which would be acceptable to Indonesia. 
Portugal found itself in a difficult position, 
caught between the Timorese lobby, which 
wanted it to stick with the resolution, and 
the fear that its text would be defeated. With 
Japanese backing, Asian members of the 
UNCHR had also decided to push for a 
'no-action' motion, supporting each other 
in an effort to avoid criticisms of their own 
human rights record. 
Rather than risk defeat, Portugal opted for 
the Consensus Declaration favoured by 
Britain, Germany and Holland. This was 
finally read out on 4 March by the UNCHR 
chairman. 
Scope for action 
The Timorese lobby was mystified as to why 
Portugal was prepared to negotiate with 
Indonesia having won such strong support 
for its resolution. 
Despite the disppointment of the 
Timorese lobby, however, the final 
declaration agreed still leaves scope for 
pressure on Indonesia. It urges Jakarta to 
improve the human rights situation in East 
Timor, and to implement the recommen-
dations of the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Torture presented to the UNCHR at the same 
session (see box, p.4). It also requests the 
UN secretary-general to follow closely the 
human rights situation in East Timor and 
'looks forward to a report', meaning 
therefore that Indonesia will have to allocate 
money and initiate a process by which this 
will be produced. 
Some would argue that the declaration is 
more binding than a resolution because it 
is a consensus and is co-signed between 
Indonesia and Portugal. If Indonesia does 
not keep its word it can be held accountable 
by all member states and co-sponsors. The 
EC has a special responsibility because it 
originally presented the resolution, and 
finally favoured a declaration. 
Indonesia has claimed victory, but the 
Suharto regime will nevertheless be under 
close scrutiny in the coming months to see 
if it keeps its promises. 
Portugal has already pointed out 
Indonesia's lack of progress in a statement 
issued on 16 March, complaining that while 
many civilians are being tried as a result of 
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the Santa Cruz massacre, 'the perpetrators 
of this brutal outrage have been neither 
brought to trial nor even identified, despite 
statements and undertakings to this effect' . 
The statement also refers to the 
commitments made by Indonesia at the 
UNCHR to treat civilians who had been 
arrested humanely, to arrange proper legal 
representation and a fair trial for those 
charged, to release immediately those not 
involved in violent activity, and to grant 
access to East Timor to human-rights and 
humanitarian organisations. 
The Portuguese note further that one of 
the prisoners on trial in East Timor for 
subversion was refused four different 
lawyers before a fifth was appointed by the 
court. Observers from the ICJ and other 
organisations, as well as foreign journalists, 
have been prevented from entering Dili . 'All 
the signs are that the means of defense 
granted to the accused, and their chances 
of a fair trial are negligible'.. . . .. 'Indonesia 
must be made to honour the undertakings 
it gave only a few days ago before the 
Commission on Human Rights and the 
international community ... .' 
• This report is partly based on a report provided 
by Russell Anderson, an Australian journalist 
who witnessed the Santa Cruz massacre and who 
lobbied at UNCHR. 
Peace 
mission 
halted 
On 27 February a Portuguese peace boat, 
the Lusitania Expresso, left Lisbon, 
aiming to sail to East Timor via Darwin 
in Australia to lay wreaths at Santa Cruz 
cemetery where the victims of last 
November's massacre were killed. On 
board were former Portuguese president 
Antonio Ramalho Eanes and 120 
journalists and peace activists from 21 
countries, including Australia, Canada, 
Japan, Italy, Britain, the United States and 
Portugal. 
As the peace mission gained sight of 
East Timor, however, it was forced to 
tum round, as Indonesian planes flew 
over threateningly. Jakarta had 
previously warned that it would arrest 
the ship's passengers and Bishop Carlo 
Belo, the Apostolic Administrator of Dili, 
had warned that the mission would bring 
disorder rather than peace. While the 
passengers could return home after the 
publicity, the mission would only create 
problems for the East Timorese. 
The controversial mission nevertheless 
succeeded in drawing attention to the 
plight of East Timor as the Indonesian 
government sought to redeem itself 
internationally. 
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Movement in 
the US? 
ARNOID KOHEN discusses whether the 
attitude of the United States has 
changed in the wake of the Santa Cruz 
massacre, looking at reactions to the 
US tour of the Indonesian foreign 
minister and the Indonesia 
government's official report on the 
killings. 
On release of the report of the Indonesian 
government-appointed Commission of 
Inquiry (KPN) on 26 December, some 
members of Congress issued letters and 
statements challenging the validity of the 
commission's findings and expressing 
concern over continuing human rights 
violations. They also suggested that US aid 
to Indonesia could be reduced or eliminated 
entirely. 
Despite sharp criticism of the KPN report 
in Congress and by the press, however, the 
US State Department stuck to its initial 
characterisation of the report as 'serious and 
responsible'; some sources close to the US 
government insist that it was heavy pressure 
from US officials, anxious to dampen 
criticism of Indonesia, which brought about 
the minor concessions in the commission's 
report in the first place (see p.4). 
Damage !Imitation? 
In February Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali 
Alatas travelled to Washington in an effort 
to defuse congressional protests and press 
criticism over the massacre and Indonesian 
policies in East Timor. Criticism focused not 
only on human rights abuses and other 
atrocities but also the fundamental fact of 
Indonesia's illegal occupation of the 
territory. 
While Alatas certainly received a 
sympathetic hearing at the State 
Department, his audience in Congress was 
far less receptive. A senior senator began 
one meeting by bluntly telling Alatas that 
after evel)thing he had heard about East 
Timar over the past 15 years, the events of 
12 November came as no surprise. The 
reaction to Alatas' message was no better 
among the main congressional activists on 
East Timar. 
As for the media, it was rough going for 
Alatas in a press lunch at the National Press 
Club. Much of the question and answer 
session was taken by sharp exchanges with 
journalists Allan Nairn and Amy Goodman, 
the American witnesses to the Santa Cruz 
massacre who were badly beaten by 
Indonesian troops. 
Other questioners focused on Indonesia's 
long history of atrocities in East Timor, the 
murder of five Australian television 
journalists by Indonesian troops in East 
Timor in 1975, the barring of several 
journalists from a press conference given 
by Alatas in London during his tour, and the 
tight restrictions on foreign press reporting. 
Alatas' efforts with the media fared no 
better elswhere. As one senior journalist for 
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a major paper put it: 'Why did he even 
bother?' Indeed, a Boston Globe editorial on 
21 February sharply attacked the Indonesian 
damage control campaign, noting that there 
was 'macabre irony' even in the location of 
Alatas' National Press Club briefing, situated 
as it was in a room dedicated to the First 
Amendment to the US Constitution, which 
guarantees freedom of the press. 
For its part, the Washington Post of 29 
February reiterated its earlier calls for 
self-determination in East Timor (see Timar 
Link, Febuary 1992) and refuted the 
arguments made by Alatas during his visit. 
Senate hearings 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
held two hearings, entitled 'Crisis in East 
Timor and US Policy Toward Indonesia', 
on 27 February and 6 March - the firs.t to 
be devoted exclusively to East Timar by the 
body. The stated aim of the hearings was 
to place the issue of self-determination for 
East Timor on Washington's political 
agenda. 
Witnesses on 27 February included Allan 
Nairn; the Rt Rev Paul Moore Jr, the former 
Anglican Bishop of New York (who visited 
East Timor in late 1989 and who had warned 
in January 1991 in a letter published in the 
New York Times of the danger of a 
Tiananmen-style massacre in East Timor); 
Geoffrey Robinson of Amnesty 
International; and Sidney Jones of Asia 
Watch, who visited East Timor in early 
February and came away shocked at the 
repressive atmosphere there. 
Nairn strongly attacked the KPN's report 
and called for a cut-off of all US military aid 
and sales of military equipment to Jakarta. 
Both Nairn and Moore made stirring appeals 
for US pressure to bring about authentic 
self-determination for East Timor. Amnesty 
and Asia Watch supplied detailed reports 
on human rights violations in the territory 
and cast doubt on Indonesian claims. 
On the morning of the 27 February 
hearing, perhaps not coincidentally, the 
Indonesian government announced that 
eight officers and enlisted men would be 
court-martialled. 
On 6 March Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State Kenneth Quinn testified. 
Contradicting numerous reports of 
Indonesian repression after 12 November, 
he was supportive of most official 
Indonesian claims about recent events and 
reiterated earlier US statements in favour of 
continued US military training to Jakarta. 'It 
seems evident that continuing co-operative 
engagement, not retribution, best serves the 
human rights goals we all seek' Quinn 
claimed. 
Regarding the political status of East 
Timar, the State Department representative 
broke no new ground. 'We support the 1982 
UN declaration to promote an Indonesian-
Portuguese dialogue under the auspices of 
the UN secretary-general to resolve the East 
Timar issue'. 
At a further hearing on 31 March on 
unrelated matters, Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee chairman Claiborne Pell asked 
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon 
several questions on East Timor. Although 
in previous testimony the State Department 
had taken pains to downplay the 
seriousness of the human rights situation in 
EastTimor in the months after 12 November, 
Solomon described it as 'serious, if not 
explosive'. 
Britain 
cautions 
Alatas, but 
arms sales 
continue 
The British Government has largely, 
though not unreservedly, accepted the 
results of the advance report of the 
Indonesian Commission of Inquiry 
(KPN). But aid and arms sales look set 
to continue. 
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
issued a statement on 28January, urging the 
Indonesian government to end human 
rights abuses in East Timor and to permit a 
special envoy from the United Nations to 
visit the territory and report on the situation 
there. 
It also urged Indonesia to 'pursue a just, 
comprehensive and internationally 
acceptable settlement of the East Timor 
issue', welcomed the sacking of two 
generals over the Santa Cruz massacre, 
called for others responsible in the armed 
forces to be punished, and called on the 
Indonesian authorities to investigate the 
'continuing discrepancies in the number 
killed' and the many unaccounted for. 
The statement was made in advance of 
the visit to London of Indonesian Foreign 
Minister Ali Alatas who assured his British 
counterpart, Douglas Hurd, on 5 February 
that action would be taken against all those 
who had broken the law in East Timor, 
including members of the armed forces, and 
that a full review of policies would be 
carried out. 
No comfort 
But if those concerned with human rights 
in East Timor had taken comfort in the 
British government's seemingly tougher 
line, this was quickly offset by the 
announcement on 15 February that Britain 
is to sell a Royal Navy supply ship to 
Indonesia for £11 million. 
The government was forced to wait 
several weeks before its announcement, 
following the screening of the First Tuesday 
documentary 'Cold Blood' on 7 January, 
which provided the British public with 
horrific on-screen evidence of the Santa 
Cruz massacre. The ship, Green Rover, 
began its refurbishment by the Swan Hunter 
Ship Yard on Tyneside in April. The Ministry 
of Defence, which confirmed the sale, 
insisted that human rights considerations 
had been considered during the sale 
negotiations. 
During Alatas's visit the Labour Party 
shadow minister for overseas development, 
Ann Clwyd had called on the government 
to uphold its stated policy of linking aid to 
'good governance' by suspending British aid 
for Indonesia (worth £22 million in 1991) 
and imposing an arms embargo. 
Clash of opinions 
On 11 March, at the University of London's 
School of Oriental and African Studies, a 
public debate took place on East Timor in 
the 1990s. 
Before a packed audience, Dr John 
Taylor, a contributor to Timor Link, and 
Peter Gordon, producer of 'Cold Blood', 
gave presentations. They were followed by 
Ariza! Effendi, head of the political 
department of the Indonesian embassy in 
London, who sought to defend Indonesian 
development of East Timor and blamed 
Portugal for many of the territory's 
problems. 
He defended the 'independence' of the 
KPN and accused foreigners of provocative 
interference, claiming Indonesia had 
escaped censure by Western governments 
at the UN Commission of Human Rights. 
He appealed to the outside world to 'stop 
flogging a dead horse' and to let Indonesia 
get on with developing East Timor 'in 
peace'. 
He denied that journalists were banned 
from East Timor and affirmed that there 
would be court-martials of offending 
military officials following the Santa Cruz 
massacre. His comments drew angry 
interjections from the audience, which 
included Timorese. 
An ecumenical memorial service for the 
victims of the Santa Cruz massacre and for 
those on trial in Jakarta and Dili was 
celebrated at St Bride's Church, Fleet Street, 
London, on 20 March. The service was led 
by Rt Rev Patrick Kalilombe, former Catholic 
Bishop of Lilongwe, Malawi. 
British Catholics petition Indonesian 
embassy 
Outraged by Yorkshire Television's 'Cold 
Blood' documentary, parishioners of St 
Agnes Church, Cricklewood, London, sent 
a 900-signature petition to their member of 
parliament, Rt Hon John Marshall, at the end 
of January. 
They also sent a copy to the Indonesian, 
Portuguese, Australian and US embassies, 
accompanied by a letter which denounced 
the Santa Cruz massacre, the illegal 
occupation of East Timar and the 'apparent 
indifference of the British, American, 
Portuguese and Australian governments'. 
In a reply which was individually sent to 
most of the petitioners listed, the Indonesian 
embassy claimed that the documentary had 
been one-sided and that 'so-called 
journalists and tourists' had incited 
demonstrators at the Santa Cruz cementery, 
leading them to provoke the armed forces. 
A helping hand 
BUGH O'SHAUGHNESSY .criticises 
the efforts of the British government 
to help the Suharto regime to 
mitigate the diplomatic damage it 
has suffered because of the Santa 
Cruz massacre. 
In March British diplomats took a leading 
part in ensuring that the UN Commission 
on Human Rights (see p.5) did not issue 
any strong censure of the regime for the 
massacre. 
· This conduct mirrored actions in the 
European Community in January when 
Britain mobilised to forestall the strong 
condemnation by the Twelve of the Dili 
massacre that was called for by Portugal, 
the current president of the community. 
Even after the EC issued its weak 
condemnation, Foreign and Common-
weath Office (FCO) spokespeople were 
under instructions to do their best to 
minimise its impact. 
of the oil lying in the Timor gap between 
Australia and occupied East Tirnor. The 
foreign minister of the Labour 
administration in Australia, Senator 
Gareth Evans, has worked closely with 
the Indonesians in attempts to solve the 
crisis in Cambodia. 
Sales of British military equipment to 
Indonesia are, even at the simplest level 
of land rovers, aiding the Indonesian war 
effort in occupied East Timor. More 
sophisticated British weapons are 
certainly being used by the Indonesian 
occupying forces against the Tirnorese 
resistance. 
Anglo-Indonesian military co-
operation, meanwhile, does not end with 
the supply of weapons. Indonesian 
officers have for several years been given 
training in Britain. After attending FCO-
arranged courses in English at Silsoe 
College near Bedford, two Indonesian 
officers are the newest in a series of men 
to study at the Royal College of Defence 
Administration at Shrivenham. 
Named Hardiwan, a Catholic officer 
in the navy, and Bambang, they are being 
taught the vital techniques necessary to 
keep forces in the field in occupied East 
Timor - with the assistance of British 
taxpayers' money administered through 
the FCO. The British Council has denied 
that any part of the men's training is 
being funded from its budget, though, 
when pressed, it did admit that it has 
made arrangements for them at the 
behest of the PCO. 
INTERNATIONAL 
International 
round-up 
European Community 
On 14 February the EC made a moliifying 
statement on East Timor. It urged Indonesia 
to bring to trial all those responsible for the 
'violent incident', as it called the Santa Cruz 
massacre, and called for clear information 
about the number killed and still missing. 
The EC was encouraged that Jakarta had 
criticised its own armed forces , that two 
senior army commanders had been 
dismissed, and that it was intending to 
conduct further investigations. It also urged 
Indonesia to treat humanely those detained 
after the shootings, to release those 
uninvolved in violent activities, and to 
ensure that those remaining in detention 
were given a fair trial. 
The EC welcomed the visit to East Timor 
of Mr Amos Wako, the personal envoy of 
the UN secretary-general (see p .3), and 
looked forward to his report. Lastly, the EC 
statement backed a 'constructive' 
Portuguese proposal for dialogue without 
preconditions between Portugal and 
Indonesia under UN auspices. (see p.5) 
The Netherlands 
On 28 February Dutch Foreign Minister 
Hans van den Broek expressed support for 
the advance report of the Indonesian 
Commission of Inquiry (KPN) and claimed 
that the measures taken against several 
soldiers showed that the Indonesian 
authorities had accepted the inquiry's 
findings that some soldiers had acted 
outside proper authority. 
Tension has nevertheless been building 
up between Holland, which ruled Indonesia 
for 350 years, and Indonesia. This followed 
a reprimand delivered by President Suharto 
when accepting the credentials of the new 
Dutch ambassador to Indonesia, which was 
received with indignation in the 
Netherlands. 
Relations deteriorated further on 26 March 
when the Indonesian government dissolved 
the International Governmental Group on 
Indonesia (IGGI), the forum through which 
aid is pledged to Indonesia. IGGI, hitherto 
chaired by the Dutch, pledged US$4.75 
billion last year. Indonesia accused the 
Dutch of political intimidation and stated 
that it wanted projects terminated within a 
month. It stressed, however, that debt 
repayments would be met. 
Indonesian Secretary of State Murdiono 
said that the Netherlands was using 
development assistance as 'a tool for 
threatening Indonesia' and cited Dutch 
criticisms of the execution in 1990 of six 
prisoners accused of participating in a 1965 
coup attempt in Indonesia as an example. 
Holland provided US$91 million of 
development aid in 1991-92. The dissolution 
of IGGI raises questions about aid 
conditionality, with Indonesia going on to 
seek a new forum for the channelling of 
aid. The World Bank has agreed to chair a 
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ne\\· forum which will hold its first meeting 
on 16-17 July in Paris. 
Japan 
Meeting in Odawara, Japan on 21-23 March, 
the International NGO Forum on Indonesia, 
composed of non-governmental organis-
ations from Asia and Western countries 
(including 30 from Indonesia itself) , 
included a statement on East Timor for the 
first time in its aide memoire. This is the 
document which NGOs use to lobby 
governments. 
The statement deplored the killings of 12 
November and stated that the differences 
between East Timar and Indonesia 'must 
be resolved by open dialogue towards a just, 
peaceful and permanent settlement' . It 
urged that development projects should 
enable the Timorese people to live in peace 
and recommended an end to coercive 
government policies, respect for the law and 
human rights , space for the activities of local 
institutions such as the church, the 
preservation of the East Timorese cultural 
identity, the establishment of local 
government, the protection of Timorese 
land rights, the abolition of economic 
CHURCH 
monopolies , and increasing the role of 
NGOs in East Timor for development 
purposes. 
Meanwhile, the Japanese government 
welcomed the Indonesian army's decision 
to punish army officers who were in 
command during the shootings in Dili, and 
said that Tokyo's policy of economic 
assistance would not change, despite the 
Santa Cruz massacre. These assurances were 
given by Japanese Foreign Minister Michio 
Watanabe on 17 February, when Ali Alatas 
visited Tokyo as part of his five-week 
'damage limitation trip ' to aid donor 
governments. 
In talks with Watanabe, Alatas criticised 
Western nations for linking economic aid 
to respect for human rights, claiming that 
the suspension of aid would not help the 
East Timorese and might cause nationalistic 
reactions in Indonesia. 
Canada 
Alatas visited Ottawa on 24 February, 
hoping to rescue Canadian aid which was 
suspended following the Santa Cruz events. 
External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall , 
referring to the advance report of the KPN, 
Timor bishop wins admiration 
At a seminar held at Yogyakarta's Gadjah 
Mada State University, Indonesia, on 27 
December, Muslim Doctor Ahmad Azahar 
Basyir, an Indonesian philosophy lecturer, 
expressed his admiration for the firm and 
consistent way in which East Timor's Bishop 
Carlos Belo, the Apostolic Administrator of 
Dili, had pursued the truth about the Santa 
Cruz Massacre. He said it set a high 
precedent for other religious leaders to 
follow on the issue, adding that 'most 
Indonesians do not have the courage to say 
what is right and what is wrong'. 
At the same seminar, Abdurrachman 
Wahid, chairman of Indonesia's Association 
of Muslim Scholars, Nahdlatul Ulama ', 
commented that 'with the input provided 
by Bishop Belo, The National Investigation 
Commission's report on the Dili tragedy 
became more accurate, although 
New publications 
on East Timor 
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'Opening Up': Travallen' Impressions 
of East Timar 1989-91 
Edited by Kirsty Sword and Pat 
Walsh. 
A booklet containing accounts of 
visitors to East Timor since the 
territory was opened up at the 
beginning of 1989. 
SOpp, available from the Australia 
East Timor Association, PO Box 93, 
Fitzroy 3065, Australia. 
'East Timar': An lntematlonal 
Responsibility 
29pp, Comment Series, Catholic 
Institute for International Relations, 
May 1992. 
This booklet sets out a brief history 
and analysis of the situation in East 
Timor, and assesses prospects for 
the future. 
Price £.1.00, available from CIIR, Unit 
3 Canonbury Yard, 190A New North 
Road, Islington, London Nl 7BJ. 
said that the Indonesian government had 
made 'considerable progress in attitude ' and 
described the Timorese charged with 
subversion as 'the perpetrators' of violence. 
The minister gave signs that Canada was 
willing to restore aid but was being 
challenged by both major opposition parties 
on the issue. 
Solidarity groups meet in Geneva 
East Timor solidarity groups from around 
the world held their 12th annual 
consultation in Geneva on 14-16 February, 
coinciding with discussion of East Timar at 
the 48th session of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights. Several eyewitnesses to the 
Santa Cruz massacre were present, as well 
as East Timorese resistance representative 
Jose Ramos Horta of the National Council 
of Maubere Resistance and Mari Alkatiri, 
deputy head of the external delegation of 
the East Timorese liberation movement 
Fretilin. 
The meeting reaffirmed its support for 
peace talks without preconditions. In 1992 
groups will make this goal, and the release 
of political prisoners, the priority for their 
work. 
theoretically it is not 100 per cent true'. 
He refuted the commonly held 
Indonesian Muslim view that Belo and East 
Timar Governor Mario Carrascalao were 
opposed to East Timor's integration, saying 
that their voices reflected their high sense 
of responsibility to their people and 
community. He felt that the Indonesian 
government and people should thank 
Bishop Belo and Mario Carrascalao for their 
courage in speaking out, especially about 
the number killed in Dili on 12 November. 
An issue presently concerning Bishop 
Belo greatly, however, is the renewal of 
visas for the foreign missionaries working 
in the territory. He recently appealed for 
more priests and religious to be allowed into 
East Timar. At present the ratio is one priest 
per 10,000 Catholics. 
Noting the increased military presence in 
East Timar since the Santa Cruz massacre, 
Belo asked whether ·civilians should be 
regarded as enemies. 'The problem will 
never be solved if we have another incident 
like the 12 November,' he said. 
New Pro-Nuncio in Jakarta 
The new pro-nuncio to Indonesia, 
Archbishop Pietro Sambi, presented his 
credentials to President Suharto on 16 
March. He praised Indonesia for 
guaranteeing religious freedom in its 
constitution and called it a model for the 
world. His speech made the local headlines 
the following day. 
Regarding the Catholic Church in East 
Timor, Archbishop Sambi denied strains in 
its relations with its Indonesian counterpart.' 
But while advocating collaboration, he said 
that 'The relationship between the church 
in East Timor and the church in Indonesia 
has to be dictated by the principles of the 
Gospel and by the nature of the church 
itself, not by the United Nations.'. 
